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Abstract 
This article examines how the Post-2015 commitment to economic inclusion affects 
informal economic actors in developing countries. It highlights the selective dynamics of 
inclusive market models which generate new processes of exclusion in which the most 
vulnerable continue to be left behind.  The case of Nigeria reveals how inclusive market 
initiatives reinforce parallel processes of informalization, poverty and Islamic extremism in 
the north of the country.  Fieldwork in northern Nigeria shows that inclusive initiatives are 
intensifying competitive struggles within the informal economy in which stronger actors are 
crowding out poorer, less educated and migrant actors, exacerbating disaffection and 
vulnerability to radicalization. 
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Introduction 
Amid buoyant growth rates across much of the developing world, growing concerns have 
been raised about the failure of market-led development strategies to include the poor in 
the benefits of growth.  After over 30 years of market reforms, the UN report ‘Realizing the 
Future We All Want’ (2012:12-15) has noted with alarm that nearly one billion people in the 
world are undernourished, more than 200 million are unemployed, 72% lack adequate 
social protection, and one-third of the urban population in developing countries live in 
slums. ‘If left unaddressed these trends may become sources of social and political 
instability.’  The numerous rounds of consultation that have informed the run-up to the 
Post-2015 Development Agenda have emphasized the need for a greater focus on 
productive development, job creation, and social protection for the vulnerable with a view 
to extending the benefits of development to the poorest and most marginalized (United 
Nations 2013; United Nations Development Group 2013).  In response to these concerns, 
the Report of the UN High Level Panel of Eminent Persons (UN 2013:1) promises to ‘bring 
about a paradigm shift’ in development policy through a commitment to social and 
economic inclusion, and a determination to ‘leave no one behind’.      
 
This paper will examine what the emerging commitment to economic inclusion actually 
offers to the poor and marginalized, with a particular focus on those working in the informal 
economy. New models of ‘inclusive markets’ that emphasize the role of global business in 
poverty alleviation and celebrate the developmental potential of informal economies point 
the way to a kinder, gentler role of markets in emerging development policy and practice.  
The question is whether the new emphasis on more inclusive models of market-led growth 
involves any fundamental change in dominant actors, interests, or policy approaches in the 
post-2015 era, and whether it effectively addresses problems of mounting poverty, 
inequality and disaffection that plague contemporary development outcomes. New 
questions need to be asked about the methods and manner of inclusion envisaged in the 
retooling of market-led development currently underway.  Do inclusive approaches to the 
informally employed offer a genuine paradigm shift in development thinking, or do they 
represent yet another exercise in neo-liberal paradigm maintenance?  Does the 
commitment to leave no one behind address the causes of exclusion, or does it simply 
attempt to treat the symptoms?  If the latter, what are the costs of yet another patch on the 
paradigm of market-led development in a situation of intensifying poverty and inequality?     
 
With the objective of separating rhetoric from reality, I will examine what commitments to 
economic inclusion actually offer to workers in the informal economy.  Drawing on recent 
research from Nigeria, I will look beyond the ‘feel-good mantra’ of inclusion to consider the 
ways in which markets are reconfigured by inclusive initiatives, and explore who benefits 
from the process.  The next section will examine the selective dynamics of inclusive market 
engagement with informal actors, revealing how uneven processes of inclusion generate 
new dynamics of exclusion.  A third section will explore inclusive approaches to market 
development in Nigeria, where global inclusion has reinforced regional inequalities between 
northern and southern Nigeria, deepening poverty and informalization in the north of the 
country.  A fourth section draws on fieldwork on the northern Nigerian informal economy 
conducted in April 2014, tracing how regional marginalization and inclusive market policies 
have combined to fuel a dynamic of poverty, disaffection and Islamic extremism.  A 
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concluding section will reflect on the hidden costs of market-based models of inclusion in 
the current climate of extreme poverty and inequality. 
 
Inclusive Markets:  Narratives, Strategies, and Blind Spots 
There is a growing recognition among international development institutions that market 
reforms alone are not enough to foster economic gains for all.  A recent World Bank/OECD 
report entitled ‘Promoting Inclusive Growth’ (de Mello and Dutz 2014:9) concedes that 
‘strong growth is not necessarily inclusive in that the benefits of increased material 
prosperity are not always shared evenly among the various social groups’.  In addition to 
ethical concerns about growing poverty, inequality and unemployment, there is a 
heightened awareness of the social, political and economic risks of wide-spread exclusion.  
The Asian Development Bank (2014:4) warns that, ‘Growth with persisting inequalities 
within a country may endanger social peace, force poor and unemployed people into 
criminal activities, make women more vulnerable to prostitution, force children into 
undesirable labour and further weaken other disadvantaged and vulnerable sections of 
population resulting in a waste of vast human capital that could otherwise be used 
productively in creating economic outputs for sustainable growth’.  This has encouraged a 
more concerted focus on mechanisms of including the poor in the benefits of growth.   
 
While inclusive growth discourses include a focus on the role of social policy in protecting 
the vulnerable, there is a strong emphasis on moving beyond what de Haan and Thorat 
(2013:11) call the ‘growth-redistribution dichotomy’.  The emphasis is on including the poor 
not simply as recipients of charity and social assistance, but as producers, consumers and 
entrepreneurs – in short, as agents of development rather than as its victims.  As de Haan 
and Thorat (2013:11) explain, ‘Inclusive growth cannot be reached simply by the state 
redistributing the gains from economic growth… Policies for inclusion need to focus also on 
the conditions under which small entrepreneurs including in the informal and rural sectors 
generate their livelihoods, on redistribution of assets and other opportunities to participate 
in growth processes, and on the conditions of jobs…’.  Drawing on equity-friendly 
discourses, it is argued that genuine inclusion requires a shift of focus from redistribution to 
structural transformation – changing the very processes through which growth takes place 
with a view to expanding employment generation and incorporating burgeoning informal 
economies.  In literature on the Post-2015 Agenda, attention is drawn to the dynamic 
potential of business to generate employment and foster entrepreneurship among the poor 
by engaging them in global value chains, improving credit provision, and providing access to 
goods and services at the bottom of the pyramid (UN 2013:26; UNDG 2013:126).   
 
This involves a reframing of poverty and informality as a product of inadequate inclusion in 
markets, rather than a result of inequities in the way markets function (Banks and Hulme 
2014; Johnson 2013).  They are recast as something that can be addressed by removing the 
barriers to participation of poor workers and consumers in labour, commodity and financial 
markets (UN 2013:26; de Mello and Dutz 2014:11).  Mendoza and Thelen (2008:438) 
contend that ‘Markets’ lack of inclusiveness can also be closely linked to a number of 
market failures. Incomplete markets (such as for credit and insurance), imperfect 
information, public goods and externalities …can make markets operate in ways that 
exclude the poor…’.  New business models emphasize the role of international business and 
finance in poverty alleviation by linking workers and consumers at the bottom of the 
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pyramid (BoP) into the benefits of global markets (Mendoza and Thelen 2008; Porter and 
Kramer 2011; Prahalad 2004; Rivera-Santos and Rufin 2010).  As Rivera-Santos and Rufin 
(2010:126) explain, ‘BOP initiatives can have an important impact on economic 
development and poverty reduction.  By integrating economically isolated people into the 
global economy, MNEs can not only provide products and services at reduced prices, but 
also create entrepreneurial opportunities for people at the BOP’.  The role of business in 
employment generation and economic inclusion is enthusiastically supported in preparatory 
documents for the Post-2015 Agenda, raising important questions about how inclusive 
arrangements are being constructed, and who is actually benefiting from them (UN 2013). 
 
In corporate as well as development circles, a growing emphasis on the role of business in 
poverty alleviation and innovative development solutions highlights the mutual benefits of 
inclusive engagement with informal actors (London and Hart 2011; Mair, Marti and 
Ventresca 2012; Rivera-Santos and Rufin 2010; Webb et al. 2010).  On the one hand, global 
firms and economic systems highlight the value of connecting directly with informal workers 
and consumers to provide jobs and affordable access to quality goods and services.  On the 
other, attention is drawn to the ability of informal institutions to fill gaps in weak regulatory 
environments, substituting such mechanisms as relational contracting and communal 
sanctions for absent formal institutions of contract enforcement or rule of law (Rivera 
Santos and Rufin 2010; Dixit 2004; Webb et al. 2010).  Notions of ‘good enough 
governance’, ‘second-best institutions’ and ‘hybrid governance’ signal a new willingness to 
work with ‘found’ institutions in developing country contexts to construct low-cost, 
workable governance arrangements for market development in areas of weak or absent 
formal institutions (Grindle 2008; Raeymaekers, Menkhaus and Vlassenroot 2008; Rodrik 
2008).  As Dixit (2004:4) suggests, ‘governmental provision of legal institutions is not strictly 
necessary for achieving reasonably good outcomes from markets…it is not always necessary 
to create replicas of Western-style state legal institutions from scratch; it may be possible to 
work with such alternative institutions as are available, and build on them’.   
   
The Selective Work of Inclusion 
What is less discussed in the celebratory literature on inclusive markets is that processes of 
inclusion are highly selective.  Through inclusive market initiatives, informal markets are 
altered rather than simply connected to the global economy.  A growing body of research 
from Africa and South Asia demonstrates how corporate engagement with informal workers 
and consumers selectively transforms the informal institutional landscape and restructures 
informal labour markets in the process of inclusion (Cross and Street 2009; Dolan, 
Johnstone-Louis and Scott 2012; Dolan and Roll 2013; Elyachar 2005; 2012).  Earlier views of 
BoP markets as ‘institutional voids’ have given way to a recognition that they constitute a 
rich institutional ecosystem that needs to be made legible to capital (Mair et al. 2012:832; 
Webb et al. 2010).  As Dolan and Roll point out (2013:140), this departs from ‘high 
modernist’ efforts to rationalize and standardize informal forms of organization, à la James 
Scott (Scott 1998), or simply ‘hopping’ over them, as James Ferguson (2006) suggests.  Quite 
the contrary, inclusive strategies involve embracing informal forms of organization by 
cataloguing habits and practices, developing ‘native capabilities,’ and mapping informal 
institutions, market potential, and consumer behaviour,  (Dolan and Roll 2013:129; London 
and Hart 2011; Meagher 2013c; World Resources Institute 2007).   
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But inclusion is not just about learning to ‘read’ informal economies; it is also about 
restructuring and governing them in line with the needs of global markets.  In the context of 
rural Bangladesh, Mair et al. (2012) argue that building inclusive markets involves ‘working’ 
informal economic spaces – classifying, restructuring and managing informal economic 
spaces to meet the needs of global business.  Dolan and Roll (2013:134) detail how efforts 
to engage with informal economies generate ‘a knowledge bank, allowing companies to 
produce a schematic of market potential that classifies the poor in terms of purchasing 
power, consumption patterns, demographics, and shopping behavior, and in so doing 
demarcates who falls within and beyond the concern of inclusive business’.   In the process, 
inclusive market strategies involve a selective reconfiguring of local institutional orders, 
labour markets and even worker subjectivities (Dolan forthcoming; Elyachar 2012; London 
and Hart 2011; Webb et al. 2010).  Mair et al. (2012:828) emphasize the need for 
‘renegotiation of existing institutional arrangements to define who can access and 
participate in markets and under which conditions’.   
 
Thus, inclusion involves renegotiating local arrangements in ways that distinguish between 
‘usable and unusable’ informal workers, and ‘usable and unusable’ informal institutions  
(Dolan and Roll 2013; Mair et al. 2012).  Selective inclusion targets particular types of 
workers over others. A focus on poverty alleviation justifies a preference for women, youth 
and migrants, accompanied by discursive as well as political processes of legitimating them 
as market actors.  It is worth noting that these are the very same categories of workers 
identified as key sources of vulnerable labour within the informal economy literature 
(Portes, Castells and Benton 1989).  Similarly, rotating credit groups, communal work parties 
and enterprise associations are celebrated as dynamic sources of social capital, while seed 
sharing groups, female seclusion and other institutions that crowd out or impede formal 
private sector interests are denigrated as obstructive of market development (Booth 2011; 
Dolan, Johnstone-Louis and Scott 2012; UNDP 2008; Webb et al. 2010).   
 
In addition to identifying which workers or institutions are useful to capital, building 
inclusive markets involves marginalizing those that are not.  Rivera-Santos and Rufin 
(2010:37) explain that ‘the links between local informal powers and firms that may see 
MNEs as competitors will increase the level of political risk, as the success of BOP initiatives 
may be dependent on eliminating existing intermediaries…’  (see also Meagher 2013c:16).  
In the process, moneylenders, informal commercial middlemen and local producers of low 
quality consumer goods are denigrated as substandard, exploitative or criminal, 
delegitimizing their participation in inclusive markets.       
 
Inclusive arrangements also engage in selectively transforming worker and consumer 
subjectivities.  Ethnographic studies of BoP distribution networks for Unilever soap, Avon 
cosmetics or solar lanterns in Third World slums expose an active process of selection and 
reconfiguring of worker subjectivities (Dolan forthcoming; Dolan, Johnstone-Louis and Scott 
2012; Dolan and Scott 2009).  Dolan and others detail the strategies of worker identification 
and intensive training on presentation, punctuality and performance metrics used to 
determine who is worthy of inclusion.  ‘Indeed, while BoP’s ‘democratization’ of opportunity 
implies universal inclusion, not all are chosen, as training, role plays and performance 
metrics sift out the potentially savvy from the lacklustre entrepreneur…’ (Dolan 
forthcoming:21).  Similarly, studies of micro-credit in India and South Africa describe the 
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techniques of governance used to turn poor borrowers into financial subjects (Hietelahti 
and Nygren 2011; Kar 2013; Mader 2012; Schwittay 2014).  Through the repurposing of 
indigenous rotating credit groups, training, shaming, and coercive practices by loan officers, 
poor women are subjected to ‘technologies of the self’ through which their behaviour is 
harmonized with the imperatives of the global financial system (Hietelahti and Nygren 2011; 
Maclean 2010; Mader 2012).  While local agency and aspiration may lead to unanticipated 
outcomes, these techniques of inclusion are often at great cost to those whose inability to 
measure up drives them even deeper into debt, poverty and despair (Kar 2013; Maclean 
2010). 
 
The Dark Side of Inclusive Markets    
Despite the positive glow surrounding inclusive markets in the Post-2015 literature, it has 
become clear that inclusive markets and financial inclusion have a ‘dark side’ (Dolan and Roll 
2013; Elyachar 2012; Hall et al. 2012; Mader 2012).  Critical commentators show that the 
potentially exploitative character of inclusion may shift more risks than gains onto poor 
borrowers and workers.  There is mounting evidence that the growing ranks of BoP 
marketers and micro-credit beneficiaries face low wages, insecure employment, intensive 
work regimes and rising debt obligations that offer ‘little substantial relief from the 
everyday vulnerabilities that informal workers experience’ (Dolan forthcoming).  For many, 
inclusive markets are experienced as ‘adverse incorporation’ – inclusion on worse terms – in 
which the benefits of inclusion are captured by more powerful market actors, while the 
adversely incorporated enjoy symbolic participation, and a greater increase in risks than in 
material gains (Hickey and du Toit 2007; Meagher and Lindell 2013; Miraftab 2004). 
 
Yet, few have looked beyond the negative effects on the adversely incorporated to the 
problem of those sidelined altogether by the selective processes of inclusion.  Despite the 
Post-2015 commitments, many are being left behind by inclusive markets.   Indeed, the side 
effect of selective inclusion is that unemployed or informal actors who are too poor, 
unskilled, or unable to accommodate demanding work and payment regimes are not 
chosen, opening up new dynamics of exclusion and inequality.  As Dolan (forthcoming) 
remarks in the context of Nairobi slums, the supposed benefits of inclusion are ‘premised on 
a reconceptualization of the meanings and practices of development, as BoP schemes 
restructure informal economies in potentially unequal ways, creating markets that open up 
new fissures between the consuming and non-consuming, the industrious and the lazy, and 
the viable and unviable poor’.  Understanding the developmental implications of inclusive 
markets requires more attention to their effects on those who fail to qualify for inclusion.  
 
The assumption that inclusion is an expanding process that will eventually absorb all of the 
excluded is contradicted by a closer examination of the countervailing dynamics of exclusion 
among those deemed too unprofitable or unruly to include. In research on inclusive tourism 
initiatives in Latin America, Hall et al. (2012) note that inclusive success stories in some 
regions of Brazil occur alongside more dysfunctional outcomes in other parts of the country 
with fewer geographical and institutional advantages.  Regions in which populations lack the 
skills or institutional support to engage constructively with inclusive initiatives face adverse 
dynamics of sex tourism and criminality.  Hall et al. (2012:801) challenge ‘recent academic 
and policy discourse suggesting that there are considerable entrepreneurial BOP 
opportunities through tourism, an industry often regarded as a panacea for economic 
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growth and social inclusion, but often resulting in destructive outcomes..’  They call for 
inclusive market enthusiasts and like-minded policy makers to be more aware of the 
unintended and often exclusive consequences of BoP initiatives, and more ‘mindful of the 
social consequences of their policies’ (ibid, 808). 
 
Responding to the need for more attention to those who do not qualify for inclusion, the 
rest of this paper focuses on the dynamics of exclusion unfolding in the shadow of inclusive 
markets.  By looking beyond the selective repurposing of informal workers and consumers, 
we can begin to recognize the vast stretches of the informal economy that inclusive markets 
exclude from the frame – not just those pinned down by childcare, social conventions or 
infirmity that limit their engagement, but active informal workers whose poor skills, social 
and occupational institutions and aspirations conflict with the requirements of formal 
business linkages.   I will challenge the assumption that inclusive market strategies can 
expand to absorb all of the excluded by examining how the struggles of those left behind 
generate increasingly dysfunctional processes of marginalization, disaffection and violence 
in the regions and social groups whose needs exceed their value to the market. 
           
Economic Inclusion and the Informal Economy in Northern Nigeria 
Recent write-ups in economic journals portray Nigeria as one of Africa’s inclusive market 
success stories.  After years of being shunned by investors owing to extreme problems of 
corruption, high inflation and political instability, Nigeria has been reimagined as an 
investor’s paradise.  Painful years of economic reforms have given way to a decade of 
growth averaging 7% per annum, in a context of high quality oil reserves, vast stretches of 
arable land, improved economic diversification and a vibrant entrepreneurial population 
estimated at 170 million people.  Nigeria has even been promoted into the select ranks of 
the MINTs, a newer, edgier club of emerging markets that have caught the attention of 
investors disappointed by the lacklustre performance of the BRICs in recent years (Mark 
2014; McBain 2014).  The MINT countries (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey) are 
distinguished by high growth rates and large young populations, offering a heady 
combination of high-risk high-return investment.  Amid ongoing problems of infrastructure 
and governance, premium retail brands, energy companies, banks, and venture capitalists 
are partnering with social enterprises and NGOs to engage with Nigeria’s consumer, 
infrastructure and employment needs, driving new forms of inclusion through jobs, services 
and access to affordable consumer goods. 
 
Yet this same Nigeria is also associated with a parallel tale of poverty, illiteracy and Islamic 
terrorism (Meagher and Hassan 2014; Mustapha 2014; Pérouse de Montclos 2014).  The 
media storm surrounding the 276 kidnapped school girls from Chibok in north-eastern 
Nigeria is only one of a growing list of news stories about the murder and mayhem 
perpetrated across northern Nigeria by the Islamic terrorist group widely known as Boko 
Haram, which translates as ‘Western education is a sin’.  Since 2010, Boko Haram has 
engaged in a reign of terror across the north of the country, taking the lives of some 15,000 
people.  Explanations tend to focus on the destructive realities of poverty and social 
deprivation in the Islamic north of the country, where resistance to Western education, and 
widespread practices of female seclusion and early marriage mean that barely one in five 
adults can read and write, and youth unemployment far exceeds the national average 
(Economist 2013; Meagher 2013b) 
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It is difficult to reconcile the image of the inclusive MINT economy with this dire scenario of 
poverty and violence.  However, a closer look reveals that two decades of punishing 
economic reforms have brought a recovery riven with inequality.  Despite Nigeria’s robust 
growth performance over the past decade, poverty has actually increased since 2004 from 
52% of the population living on less than US$1 per day to 61% by 2010 (National Bureau of 
Statistics 2010:5).  Unemployment figures have nearly doubled since 2000, with figures for 
youth unemployment approaching 40% (National Bureau of Statistics 2011).  With 
population growth still running at 2.8% per year, Nigeria is confronting a demographic 
tsunami that puts 1.8 million new entrants into the job market every year with few formal 
jobs to absorb them (NBS 2011:7).  Indeed, a World Bank (2010:20) report on the Nigerian 
labour force estimates that the formal economy has shrunk by 33% between 1999-2006.  
Conversely, Nigeria’s informal economy has burgeoned to between 58 and 83% of the non-
agricultural labour force (CBN/FOS/NISER 2001; Schneider 2002; Treichel 2010).  Proponents 
of inclusive market approaches contend that investment and creative entrepreneurship can 
address these pressures by linking the nation’s vast labour force and consumer markets into 
the resource flows, innovative business models and technical expertise of the global 
economy, turning Nigeria’s rapidly growing population from a potential threat into an 
opportunity.  The question to be raised here is whether inclusive market initiatives are part 
of the solution, or part of the problem.    
 
Inclusive Markets and Economic Inequality 
Decades of market reforms and rapid population growth have not only increased inequality 
at the national level; they have exacerbated long-standing patterns of regional inequality.  A 
history of educational disadvantage in the Muslim north – as much a legacy of colonial 
policy as it is a product of Muslim resistance to Western education – has left the northern 
Nigerian population ill-equipped to respond effectively to global economic restructuring.  In 
the post-independence period, employment in the educationally disadvantaged northern 
states was dominated by agriculture and formal sector employment, both of which have 
declined dramatically under neo-liberal market reforms. Pressures of high population 
growth, recurrent drought and a lack of investment in small-scale farming have undermined 
the agricultural economy, triggering rapid migration into northern urban centres. At the 
same time, the north’s urban economy has been gutted by deindustrialization and 
contracting public employment.  The textile industry, once the nation’s largest industrial 
employer, was concentrated in the northern states of Kano and Kaduna.  Decaying 
infrastructure and import competition has reduced the number of textile and garment firms 
from 175 in the mid-1990s to fewer than 25 in 2010, with a loss of over 110,000 jobs 
(Nwachukwu 2005). 
   
Low levels of formal education have left northerners poorly positioned to take up the new 
opportunities offered by the shift toward more inclusive market initiatives, since these 
generally demand rising levels of skills and technical education (World Bank 2010).  
Investors have responded by focusing inclusive initiatives on Lagos and the south-west, 
while largely ignoring the less attractive northern states. For the majority of northerners, 
Nigeria’s resurgence has brought little in the way of new opportunity beyond chancing it in 
an increasingly saturated informal economy.  The result is to reinforce the concentration of 
poverty, illiteracy and unemployment in the northern zones of the country.  As Table 1 
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indicates, poverty levels in the north-west and north-east zones of Nigeria are 40% higher 
than in the prosperous south-western zone, unemployment is three times higher, and 
illiteracy among adults is four times the levels found in the south-west (NBS 2010:5).  An 
alarming 64% of the population in the core north has no Western education, while this is 
true of only 17% of people in the south-west (National Population Commission and RTI 
International 2011:13,16).  A virtuous cycle of enthusiastic investment and governance 
improvements in the south-west have been accompanied by deepening economic decline, 
corruption and poverty in the north.   
 
While the alarming levels of economic exclusion in the north are a product of the perverse 
regional effects of decades of market reforms, the question here is whether new inclusive 
market initiatives by investors and policymakers can address the problem.  Can investors be 
encouraged to engage in inclusive initiatives in the north amid the ravages of poverty, 
illiteracy, unemployment and crumbling infrastructure?  Is there a need for donor and state-
led initiatives to take the lead through inclusive market programmes of youth employment, 
enterprise promotion, and micro-credit?  Can we assume that the selective dynamics of 
inclusive market initiatives will respond to the needs of the excluded, or will they create 
new pressures and tensions in an already strained economic and political environment? 
Assessing the implications of inclusive market initiatives requires a clearer understanding of 
the distinctive dynamics of exclusion through which the not-yet-included attempt to 
reconfigure informal labour markets and narratives of social legitimacy in their struggle over 
livelihoods. 
 
 
Table 1:  Indicators of Socio-Economic Deprivation in Nigeria by Zone 
 
Zone Absolute 
Poverty 
No Schooling Adult Literacy Unemployment 
North-East 69.0 63.7 23.0 31.9 
North-West 70.0 63.8 21.6 28.8 
North-Central 59.5 36.8 47.0 28.8 
South-East 58.7 14.4 81.8 19.6 
South-West 49.8 17.2 79.8 11.4 
South-South 55.9 10.7 77.1 24.6 
Source:  NPC DHS Education Data Survey 2010; NBS Poverty Profile 2010; NBS Annual Socio-
Economic Report 2011.  
 
 
Informal Economies and New Dynamics of Exclusion in Northern Nigeria 
Exploring the dynamics of informal economies in the shadow of inclusive markets is an 
empirical endeavour, which draws on fieldwork conducted in northern Nigeria in April 2014, 
in the cities of Kano and Kaduna.  These two cities are epicentres of the northern Nigeria’s 
dynamic informal economy, but both have experienced Nigeria’s resurgence as a time of 
rising instability and religious violence (Meagher 2013a).  Kano is a pre-colonial commercial 
centre of about two million people, while Kaduna was founded by the British as a colonial 
capital, and has a population of about one million.  Both are Muslim majority cities, with 
commercially dynamic Christian minorities from southern Nigeria who play a significant role 
10 
 
in the informal economy.  Both cities also have significant populations of Muslim migrants 
from across northern Nigeria, as well as from poorer Sahellian countries north of the border. 
 
This history has fostered a complex informal economy made up of indigenous Muslim 
professions and trading activities, such as tailoring, butchering and cattle trading; modern 
commercial activities such as auto-parts trade and auto mechanics dominated by Christian 
migrants, and a range of lower-income activities dominated by migrants from poorer states 
across the northern Nigerian and Sahelian region (Meagher 2009a; Onokerhoraye 1977).  
Far from creating friction between Muslim and Christian informal actors, the religious and 
ethnic division of labour has given rise over time to high levels of cooperation among 
informal economic actors, with Muslims and Christians linked by credit, supplier and 
customer networks across religious lines (Anthony 2002; Meagher 2013a).  However, years 
of formal sector contraction and hard economic times have precipitated new struggles and 
tensions within the informal economy as more educated actors from the formal sector 
move into the informal economy, and migrants as well as indigenes struggle to gain access 
to available economic opportunities.  
 
This paper draws on fieldwork conducted as part of a wider project on Islamic radicalization 
in northern Nigeria. The original research focused on the role of the informal economy in 
the rise of Islamic extremism, focusing on eight types of common Muslim informal activities 
(Meagher and Hassan 2014).  These involved tailors, media distributors (CD and phonecard), 
motorized rickshaw operators, butchers, food sellers, hawkers, load carriers and motorcycle 
taxis.1  Available estimates for four of these activities put the number of operators at 
100,000 – 110,000 across the two cities, suggesting overall participation in the study 
activities of some 10-15% of the urban labour force.  With a view to examining relevant 
economic dynamics, these informal activities were divided into three categories:   
 Modern activities that offer opportunities for economic advancement and a measure 
of social status.  Informal media distributors, tailors and motorized rickshaw 
operators were included in this category, as these are activities that have significant 
skill and capital-based barriers to entry, and are considered compatible with 
education and middle-class status. 
 Traditional activities that lack modern technology, have low social status but offer 
prospects for economic advancement.  This category included butchers and food 
sellers, which are indigenous professions associated with a lack of education, but 
have some skill and capital-based barriers to entry, and can give rise to profitable 
businesses.  
 Survival activities which are arduous, low status, and offer little or no prospects for 
economic advancement.  This includes motorcycle taxis, load carriers and hawkers – 
all activities with minimal barriers to entry, and are considered degrading to 
participants with post-primary education or social aspirations. 
 
Fieldwork involved 18 interviews with the leadership of relevant enterprise associations, as 
well as 35 interviews and 8 focus group discussions with Muslim informal enterprise 
operators.  Associational leaders were interviewed in their shops, headquarters or other 
                                                          
1
 To the extent possible, the same activities were investigated in Kano as well as in Kaduna, with minor 
variations.  At the time of the study, motorcycle taxis had been banned in Kano, but not in Kaduna, although 
they were banned in Kaduna in May 2014, shortly after the fieldwork was completed. 
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places of their choosing, while rank and file informal operators from each activity were 
randomly selected from key areas of operation across the two cities and interviewed in their 
place of operation.  All interviews were conducted by myself and a Hausa colleague, with 
translation and logistical support from local research assistants where necessary (see 
Meagher and Hassan 2014).  Interviews were used to construct a survey of 187 Muslim 
informal operators in the selected activities, which followed the same stratified 
opportunistic sampling procedure.  The survey yielded the quantitative data used in the 
remainder of the article.  The accumulated evidence reveals a number of emerging tensions 
within the northern Nigerian informal economy that destabilize optimistic narratives of 
inclusion.  Mounting economic stress and governance failures are generating increasingly 
worrying patterns of competition and conflict among those struggling over scarce 
opportunities in the margins of inclusive markets  
 
Struggling for Inclusion in Northern Nigeria 
What is immediately obvious from an examination of the local context in northern Nigeria is 
the saturation of the informal economy, even in commercially dynamic cities like Kano and 
Kaduna.  Despite the creation of new activities such as motorcycle taxis, phone card kiosks, 
and the production and distribution of local film and music CDs, the absorptive capacities of 
the informal economy have been exhausted by decades of formal sector contraction, rapid 
population growth and migration from agriculturally challenged rural areas.  Indeed, many 
of those turning to self-employment are being absorbed as disguised labour rather than as 
entrepreneurs – what Philip Mader (2012) refers to as ‘entreployees’.  While all respondents 
were selected as heads of enterprises, in nearly one-third of firms, apparently owner-
operated businesses involve people working on commission or engaged in hire-purchase 
arrangements in which a considerable proportion of their modest daily returns are passed 
on to an absentee owner of the goods or machines (Table 2).  Even in comparatively 
lucrative modern activities, nearly 20% work on commission for an absentee owner, and 
there is a notable level of hire-purchase arrangements particularly among motorized 
rickshaw operators. 
   
 
Table 2:  Ownership and Indigeneity in Northern Nigerian Informal Activities  
(% of Enterprise Heads) 
 
Activity 
Type 
Enterprise 
Heads 
Who Own 
Their 
Business 
Enterprise 
Head Who 
Work on 
Hire 
Purchase or 
Commission  
 
No. of 
Years 
in 
Activity 
Enterprise 
Heads who 
are 
Indigenes of 
the State in 
Which They 
Operate 
Enterprise 
Heads with 
Negative 
Attitude to 
Entry of Non-
Indigenes 
Modern 73.8 26.2 10.4 63.6 34.4 
Traditional 79.3 20.7 15.3 58.3 30.0 
Survival 53.3 46.7 9.6 42.6 42.6 
Average 68.9 31.1 11.7 55.1 35.7 
 
Source:  Fieldwork 
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These forms of ‘disguised employment’ are particularly marked in survival activities.  
Despite low barriers to entry compared to other informal activities, barely half of the 
survivalist operators interviewed actually owned their business.  Hire-purchase 
arrangements are common among motorcycle taxis in Kaduna, and some load carriers do 
not even own their wheelbarrows outright.  A worrying one third of survivalists work on 
commission, spread across motorcycle taxi operators, load carriers and hawkers, who either 
receive a commission on the day’s takings, or pay fixed returns to the owner of the business 
or equipment regardless of the daily takings (Meagher 2013a).  The high share of enterprise 
heads who do not own their business cannot be attributed to the process of getting started, 
since many dependent owner-operators have been in business several years.  Indeed, 
among survivalists, independent operators and those working on commission or hire-
purchase arrangements have all been in business for an average of 9-10 years.  Far from 
being a sphere of independent entrepreneurship, the northern Nigerian informal economy 
involves a significant share of dependent operators who appear autonomous, but do not 
actually own their enterprise despite several years in the activity.     
 
The saturation of the informal economy has been accompanied by growing levels of 
contestation between state indigenes and non-indigenes over access to informal jobs.  
While informal activities, particularly lowly survival activities, used to be the preserve of 
migrants from poorer parts of northern Nigeria or from surrounding Sahellian states, 
indigenes of Kano and Kaduna states are now crowding into these activities in growing 
numbers.  Indigeneity is a central mechanism for claiming citizenship rights in Nigeria, 
where access to public sector jobs, scholarships and other state benefits is claimed through 
a citizen’s state of origin, not through the state of residence (Mustapha 1998).  
Conventionally invoked in struggles over public sector jobs, indigeneity is increasingly 
central to struggles over access to informal activities, even in some of the lowliest sectors, 
such as load carriers and hawkers.  In Kano and Kaduna, state indigenes now make up over 
40% of those in lowly survival activities, as well as dominating modern and traditional 
activities.  A majority of informal actors in all three categories of activities noted that the 
share of indigenes in their activity has been rising – a perception shared by both indigenes 
and non-indigenes.  An elderly load carrier in Kano, himself an indigene, commented that, 
with the collapse of formal sector industry and the lack of alternatives sources of income, 
indigenes are rushing into load carrying and other menial informal activities.   
 
Livelihood pressures, combined with a high sense of entitlement among indigenes – 
particularly those with higher levels of education – have fed a growing sense of resentment 
against the entry of non-indigenes into informal activities.  Despite a moral context in which 
the poor are seen as entitled to earn a living, more than a third of informal operators 
expressed concerns that the entry of non-indigenes into their activity is bad for business.  
Negative attitudes to the entry of non-indigenes are particularly pronounced in survival 
activities, where 43% of informal operators expressed resistance to non-indigenes entering 
their activity.2  Some argued that non-indigenes should not be allowed to take up even 
informal activities when indigenes are struggling to find work.  Many also expressed 
                                                          
2
 While the majority on indigenes in survival activities expressed resistance to the entry of non-indigenes, 
some of those expressing these attitudes were themselves non-indigenes keen to protect themselves from 
further competition. 
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concerns about saturated markets, and the importance of keeping non-indigenes out of the 
business in order to prevent incomes from being competed down.  Motorized rickshaw 
operators are particularly resistant to entry by non-indigenes despite a broad similarity in 
ethnic origins, claiming that they overcharge customers, have rough driving habits, and are a 
security risk.   
 
Just as indigenes are crowding out non-indigenes, more educated actors have begun to 
crowd out the less educated.  Table 3 shows that levels of education in the sample are 
surprisingly high considering regional data showing that 64% of northerners have no 
Western education (see Table 1).  Overall, only 25% of informal actors in the sample have no 
Western education, though predictably, lack of education among those in traditional 
activities is much higher at nearly 40%.  What is particularly worrying is the high level of 
secondary and post-secondary education among northern Nigerian informal operators.  An 
average of 42% have secondary education or higher.  Even in survival activities, 28% have 
secondary school certificates, and 12% have post-secondary qualifications.  Load carriers in 
the market with post-secondary diplomas and even university degrees were encountered in 
both Kano and Kaduna.  In more lucrative modern activities, 60% of actors have secondary 
education or more, including nearly 20% with post-secondary qualifications.  However, 
poverty and inadequate state funding have meant that the quality of education in northern 
Nigeria is often very poor, limiting access to the few formal jobs available, and channelling 
growing numbers of certificate holders into the informal economy.        
 
 
Table 3:  Education Levels and Religious Affiliation of Muslim Informal Enterprise Heads 
(% of Enterprise Heads) 
 
 
 
Activity Type 
 
 
No 
Western 
Education 
 
 
Secondary 
School  
Certificate 
 
 
Post-
Secondary 
Qualification 
Enterprise 
Heads Claiming 
Activity Offers 
Good Prospects 
for Level of 
Education 
Enterprise 
Heads 
who are 
Salafist 
Muslims 
Enterprise 
Heads Claiming 
Different 
Religious 
Affiliations 
Bring Divisions 
Modern 10.6 42.4 18.2 69.2 51.5 20.3 
Traditional 38.3 20.0 5.0 58.6 21.7 17.2 
Survival 26.2 27.9 11.5 54.4 26.2 6.7 
Average 24.6 30.5 11.7 61.1 33.7 14.8 
 
Source:  Fieldwork 
 
 
While some respondents see rising levels of education in their activity as bringing new 
opportunities for innovation, high levels of education are also accompanied by significant 
disaffection.  While nearly 70% of those in modern activities felt that their activity offers 
good prospects for advancement given their level of education, this is true of only 54% of 
those in survival activities.  Educated operators in lowly activities, such as hawking and load 
carrying, expressed a sense of frustration over the failure of Western education to deliver 
on the promise of a dignified livelihood.  Conversely, in more lucrative modern activities, 
frustration was expressed by less educated actors that they are being crowded out of their 
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traditional occupational niche by unemployed graduates who have more capital and better 
contacts.  Tailors trained though years of traditional apprenticeship, local CD distributors 
from indigenous trading backgrounds, and motorized rickshaw operators who entered the 
business from other parts of the informal transport sector feel threatened by more 
educated actors able to monopolize economic opportunities within the activity.  A Kano 
tailor complained that despite lacking proper skills, “yan boko” (educated people) are 
dominating the business.  Either way, this has bred a growing resentment against Western 
education which stems as much from its failure to improve livelihoods as from religious 
opposition. 
 
Pressures of indigeneity and education within a saturated informal economy have 
intersected with the rise of new religious movements within Islam, as northerners attempt 
to reimagine their place within the Nigerian economic and political system.  In particular, 
Salafist Islamic movements have generated a new narrative of inclusion that has proven 
attractive to struggling traders and middle classes striving to withstand the pressures of 
market reforms and political marginalization.  Salafism represents a fundamentalist form of 
Sunni Islam originating in Saudi Arabia, which has come to constitute a challenge to the 
relatively tolerant and culturally accommodating Sufi and other mainstream Sunni sects that 
predominate in northern Nigeria and much of West Africa (Mustapha and Bunza 2014).  The 
most influential Salafist movement in northern Nigeria, Jama't Izalat al Bid'a Wa Iqamat as 
Sunna (Society of Removal of Innovation and Reestablishment of the Sunna), conventionally 
known as Izala, represents a strident modernizing force with a strong emphasis on 
education, frugality and individual achievement – reminiscent of an Islamic version of the 
Protestant ethic  (Kane 2003; Masquellier 1999; Meagher 2009b; Umar 1993).  The Izala 
movement is strongly oriented toward reform of the state, but is explicitly against violence.  
However, tendencies toward intolerance, provocation and capture of Islamic and state 
institutions have bred conflict and resentment among Christians and other Muslims (Casey 
2008; Mustapha and Bunza 2014).   
 
In the informal economy, Salafist groups, dominated by Izala, still constitute a minority of 
Muslims, averaging only one-third of enterprise heads in the sample (see Table 3).  Despite 
being in the minority, Salafist groups are heavily concentrated among the most lucrative 
category of enterprises where they make up over 50%.   Salafists also tend to be the most 
highly educated group across all activity categories.  In the sample, 54% of Salafists had 
secondary education or better, compared to only 38% and 33% of mainstream and Sufi 
Muslims, respectively.  In modern activities, the high share of Salafists is associated with a 
growing orientation toward competitiveness and personal advancement which has tended 
to disrupt systems of occupational solidarity, social integration and communal 
redistribution.  The Salafist ethos of frugality and rugged individualism discourages lavish 
ceremonial expenditure and cliental redistribution of resources, ignoring the important role 
of these practices in the redistribution of food, money and petty employment within the 
community (Mustapha and Bunza 2014; Umar 1993).  Conventionally, successful tailors or 
CD distributors would keep on a few ‘boys’ who run errands in return for a little food or 
money.  Salafist operators prefer to avoid wasteful social expenditure and in interviews 
spoke of letting their boys go when business is slow.  Gains in rational resource use and 
accumulation are experienced as a loss of social support among poorer relatives and 
community members, intensifying economic pressure and disaffection among the poor. 
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In addition to dominating lucrative activities and withdrawing from communal systems of 
redistribution, Salafists appear to be increasing their grip on influential informal enterprise 
associations.  Within the sample, Salafists were conspicuous in their lack of participation in 
ordinary enterprise associations, but they were active in large, well-connected enterprise 
associations, such as the nationally-federated National Butchers Union, and the motorized 
rickshaw operators association, which enjoy access to state-level and even federal-level 
politicians as well as to state economic assistance to carry out activities or support 
members.  While Salafists made up only 20% of the participants in small informal enterprise 
associations, such as neighbourhood tailors’ unions, or market-based hawkers associations, 
they constituted 40% of those in politically-connected associations.  In the process, the 
Salafist project of individual accumulation, aggressive institutional capture and withdrawal 
from communal redistribution is monopolizing opportunities and resources within the 
informal as well as the formal economy.   
 
The resulting social and political vacuum among the excluded has created a fertile space for 
Islamic extremist movements.  Already excluded from the formal economy, new struggles 
within the informal economy draw on indigeneity, education and the Salafist ethic to further 
exclude those unable to compete on their terms.  Boko Haram emerged in the early 2000s 
from a schism within Salafism and quickly became a magnet for disaffected youth searching 
for a new Islamic narrative of inclusion (Mustapha 2014; Mustapha and Bunza 2014).  
Representing an extreme form of Salafism, Boko Haram focuses not on reforming, but on 
destroying the state as irredeemably corrupt and godless, as well as designating all other 
Islamic sects as ‘not really Muslims’ and therefore legitimate targets of violence.  As a well-
known reporter close to the sect explained, the leader of Boko Haram ‘took advantage of 
the irresponsible leadership at all levels of government as unemployment, poverty, 
corruption and insecurity become the order of the day.  And, as he points out such failures, 
citing versus of the Qur’an and the sayings of the Prophet, the youth see him as the leader 
that will indeed deliver them from malevolence to the promised land…’ (Ahmed Salkida in 
Mustapha and Bunza 2014:85). 
 
Key to the attraction of Boko Haram in its early stages was its responsiveness to the needs 
of the poor and disaffected.  As noted by Governor Kashim Shettima of Borno State, where 
Boko Haram emerged and remains entrenched:  
 
The late Boko Haram leader, Mohammed Yusuf, despite his misguided ideology, retained the loyalty 
of his supporters by providing one meal a day to each of his disciples. Yusuf also had a youth 
empowerment scheme, under which he helped his disciples to go into petty trading and 
wheelbarrow porters. He also arranged inexpensive marriages between sect members, which 
enabled many of them to marry and gave them personal dignity and self-worth (cited in NSRP 
2014:16). 
 
While the heavy-handed actions of the state security services have played a significant role 
in tipping Boko Haram supporters from religious extremism into terrorism, extreme 
economic marginalization has created the fuel for that fire (Meagher and Hassan 2014; 
Mustapha 2014b).     
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Inclusive Market Policies and Islamic Extremism   
Inclusive market policies have been brought in to address the tense economic context in 
northern Nigeria.  Nigeria has initiated a broad array of inclusive market policies, including 
the standard package of youth employment programmes, entrepreneurship programmes 
and the active promotion of micro-credit (Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme 
2014:28).  High profile programmes such as Subsidy Reinvestment and Empowerment 
Programme (Sure-P) created from the resources generated by the controversial partial 
removal of the petrol subsidy, the Youth Enterprise with Innovation in Nigeria Programme 
(YouWIN!) supported by a combination of state, bilateral donor and private sector funding, 
and the Youth Employment and Social Support Operation (YESSO) which focuses on public 
works, skills training and cash transfers, are being supplemented by a range of additional 
youth employment and entrepreneurship programmes constantly being announced (NSRP 
2014:7).  In addition, the active promotion of micro-finance by the Central Bank of Nigeria in 
response to problems of severe unemployment and political instability has seen the number 
of licenced micro-finance institutions rise from 160 in 2001 to over 900 by 2014 (Thom-
Otuya 2014:227; Vanguard 2014). 
 
Yet this profusion of inclusive market initiatives have tended to worsen rather than ease the 
problems of economic inclusion and political instability in northern Nigeria.  Concerns have 
been raised about the poor implementation and funding of these programmes, but even 
more problematic is the very design of the policies, which simply exacerbate the dynamics 
of exclusion currently at work in the northern Nigerian informal economy.  Youth 
employment and entrepreneurship programmes such as SURE-P and YouWIN! are heavily 
focused on assisting graduates to start up small-scale enterprises, intensifying the problem 
of graduates crowding out the existing occupants of the informal economy.  Micro-finance 
initiatives only offer enough credit to support entry into survival activities, exacerbating 
existing problems of saturation and over-competition.  With a loan ceiling of N500,000, 
interest rates of 9-10% per month, and short repayment schedules, micro-finance is totally 
inadequate to the needs of more lucrative informal activities where credit could be used to 
create employment for others rather than just fostering a proliferation of competing one-
person survival activities, as tailors in both Kano and Kaduna explained at length (NSRP 
2014:21; Meagher 2013a, 2014).   
 
The core problem is not one of corruption or inept implementation, though this may also 
apply.  The very design of this donor-led stable of inclusive market programmes views the 
informal economy as a boundless sponge, and takes no account of the power struggles 
taking place within it.  Instead of addressing the stresses of market saturation, poverty and 
exclusion of the less advantaged, these policy packages channel graduates into the informal 
economy from above, and pump micro-credit borrowers into survival activities from below, 
intensifying the pressures already crowding out the poor, uneducated and desperate. 
 
Instead of being part of the solution, these inclusive market policies are only adding to the 
problem.  A recent report on youth unemployment by the DfID-funded Nigeria Stability and 
Reconciliation Programme (NSRP 2014:8) found that 79% of young people interviewed felt 
that one needed political connections in order to be selected for any of these programmes.  
Indeed, in Kano and Kaduna, skilled non-indigenous tailors and embroiderers were 
dismissive of any potential for benefitting from the Sure-P programme, since the resources 
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are distributed via Local Governments, which, aside from very real concerns about 
corruption, would find it politically impossible to direct them toward non-indigenes of the 
state.  Similarly, a DfID-funded scheme to upgrade the meat marketing chain through 
engagement with butchers has met with local resistance.  A Kano State government scheme 
that provided training, equipment and N20,000 (US$ 125.00) each to 10,001 butchers in 
2013, was regarded with suspicion by members of the Kano butchers association (This Day 
2013).  Butchers in Kano complained of the imposition of policy templates from outside that 
take little account of existing organizational systems in their activity, and were uneasy about 
the tendency to privilege educated entrants, exacerbating internal organizational tensions.  
The NSRP report (2014:9) argues that ‘initiatives such as YouWIN! and SURE-P, which 
currently are the focus of media attention, are treated with some scepticism, as somehow 
incidental to real priorities around making the economy work for the majority. …In the 
worst cases, programme delivery may actually work against the goals of conﬂict reduction 
and empowerment, and create further exclusion and disaffection.’     
 
While the majority of informal operators manage to cope with the frustrations and 
livelihood pressures of the current economic climate, mounting poverty and desperation, 
combined with the heavy-handed response of state security services have pushed some 
over the edge into violence.  The former governor of the Nigerian Central Bank, (and now 
Emir of Kano) Lamido Sanusi, explained, ‘the security situation in this part of the country is 
fundamentally linked to the absence of job opportunities and to the quality of life of the 
people. Unless these real economic issues are addressed, we will not likely find a long-
lasting solution to the political and security problems’ (Onuba and Adesomoju 2013).  Yet, 
current policies of selective inclusion are feeding into rather than resolving new dynamics of 
exclusion within the northern Nigerian informal economy.  If inclusive markets have no use 
for those without skills or cultural values amenable to the demands of global capitalism, the 
excluded do not simply stand by quietly, waiting to be included.  They devise alternative 
narratives of inclusion, or are drawn to other, more unruly forms of political expression 
(Khanna 2012).    
 
Conclusion:  Inclusive Markets and Faustian Bargains 
The selective process of inclusion tends to gloss over what happens to the people and places 
unable to engage with the labour regimes and new consumer lifestyles of inclusive 
capitalism.  As the case of Nigeria illustrates, it is not enough to recognize that many are left 
behind; it is also essential to understand the new dynamics of exclusion generated by 
inclusive markets.  At the national level in Nigeria, inclusive markets put the needs of 
investors over those of the poor in ways that tend to exacerbate inequalities.  At the sub-
national level, the dynamics of marginalization in the disadvantaged north have unleashed 
competitive pressures within an increasingly saturated informal economy in which stronger 
players are crowding out the weak – the poor, migrants and the less educated – in the face 
of new religious movements to rework the terms of inclusion.  Within this context, inclusive 
market initiatives such as youth employment, entrepreneurship and micro-credit schemes 
have tended to make things worse by channelling graduates and micro-loans recipients into 
an overstretched informal economy, exacerbating existing tensions of political, economic 
and religious entitlement.  Ultimately, the perverse dynamics of inclusion have served to 
deepen desperation and disaffection among those unable to compete, creating a tinderbox 
for Islamic extremism. 
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Breaking the black box of the informal economy in inclusive market narratives, and 
scrutinizing both the selective dynamics of inclusion and new dynamics of exclusion that 
result, exposes the flaws in the Post-2015 promise to ‘leave no one behind’ (UN 2013:1).  
Market-led efforts to engage with the informal economy are not only shifting additional 
risks and pressures onto the poor, but deepening processes of exclusion among those 
unable to qualify for inclusion.  This raises wider questions about whether inclusion in 
markets is the best way to address the needs of those left behind by decades of market 
reform (Banks and Hulme 2014:193; Saith 2006).  To begin with, one might wonder whether 
policies to channel the poor and unemployed into the informal economy through micro-
credit and small-enterprise schemes can be regarded as genuinely ‘inclusive’.  As James 
Heintz (Heintz 2012:18) points out, ‘To the extent that exclusion from social protections and 
legal rights limit choices and mobility, a reduction in the proportion of people informally 
employed would constitute an important element of an employment-focused approach to 
inclusive growth…’ (my italics).  Simply shifting the definition of inclusion to embrace 
employment in the informal as well as the formal economy does not address the needs of 
the poor; it just defines away their exclusion.  Indeed, in the northern Nigerian informal 
economy, the competitive struggles underway indicate that the excluded are more 
concerned about inclusion in some form of political protection than inclusion in markets.  
Claims of indigenes to preferential access to work and assistance, and the focus of Izala 
adherents on capturing state and other institutions suggest that for the economically and 
politically insecure, economic inclusion is more about access to state support than access to 
markets.   
 
In the final analysis, the focus on access to markets rather misses the point.  As Hulme and 
Banks (2014:191) explain, unless development solutions go beyond fixing gaps in the market 
to redressing inequities in the way markets function,  ‘market based solution do not and will 
not address the root structural causes of poverty and inequality’.  The transformative 
potential of business and private sector actors depends on challenging existing systems of 
inequity, rather than simply extending them to a wider range of participants.  The current 
discourses of inclusion seem more focused on shoring up than challenging the neo-liberal 
paradigm of market-led growth, making the Post-2015 shake-up of development policy look 
more like another exercise in paradigm maintenance than a genuine paradigm shift (Wade 
1996).  While constructing a ‘feel good mantra’ to galvanize global consensus around a new 
development narrative, inclusive discourses gloss over the ongoing failure of markets to 
address the underlying structural causes of inequality and exclusion (Gore 2000; Gore 2010; 
Saith 2006:1189).  Charles Gore (2010:71) refers to this as a ‘Faustian bargain’ that buys 
global consensus at the cost of abandoning the core development goals of social and 
economic equality.  However, it is a bargain that also glosses over the growing risks of 
paradigm maintenance, expressed in a rising tide of xenophobic riots, religious extremism 
and other forms of violent unrest among those that inclusive markets continue to leave 
behind (Hickel 2014; Khanna 2012; Osterbo 2012; Resnick and Thurlow 2015).  The problem 
with Faustian bargains is the terrible costs they will eventually extract from us all. 
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